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EDITORIAL NOTES
THE Ravmw-It is hoped that this Ravmw
may be of service to the law students, the
law teachers, the members of the bar, and to
the judges upon the bench, and, through them,
to the people of the state.'
As a supplement to the routine daily class
work of the School, it -will afford to the sec-
ond and third year students, a means of in-
tensive training in legal writing. To them,
the independent experience, under faculty
supervision, in the analysis, investigation and
critical discussion of current problems in
North Carolina law will be invaluable. As
the REviEw goes into volumes year by year,
it will constitute a collection of reference
materials on the local law, of definite value as
collateral readings in connection with class
discussion.
To the faculty of the School, the REVIEw
will be an added incentive to systematic re-
search in the state law and a medium for the
' For an interesting account of the possible uses
of such a publication as this, see Herbert F. Good-
rich, The Scope and Function of a State Law Re-
giew, Proceedings, Association of American Law
Schools, 1920, 157.
publication of the results achieved. To the
members of the bar and the judges upon the
bench, the REvIEW will make available, in the
form of leading articles, editorial notes and
comments, discussions of important legal prob-
lems, statements of the significance of out-
-standing recent state and federal decisions,
and historical accounts of the development of
distinctive topics and doctrines of North
Carolina law. In other words, the REviEw
will carry to the active members of the legal
profession, the work the School is doing in
tracing the development of law in North
Carolina and in the country at large.
Of equal importance to the law student and
to the law teacher, will be the opportunity
afforded by the REvIEw to learn of the atti-
tude, the needs, and the problems of the
attorneys and judges in active practice. It is
hoped that those who are daily carrying on
the litigation and the legal work of the state
may find in the ;rviaw a means of express-
ing their reactions to, and their constructive
suggestions for dealing with, the difficulties
encountered in the practical administration of
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the law. Only through this closer contact and
understanding can the lawyer, the judge, the
law student, and the law teacher effectively
unite in what should be a common effort for
the solution of modern legal problems. In
this latter connection, namely, that of the
public service of the legal profession as a
whole, particular attention will be given in
the pages of the REVIEW to the influence upon
legal problems of matters of legislation, gov-
ernment, business, and social and economic
conditions.
THE SCHOOL OF LAw-The School of Law
opened its seventy-ninth year last fall with
an initial registration of 113 students, the
largest in the history of the School.
The new three year course of study has
been in operation this year, with thirteen third
year students, thirty-three in the second year
class, and sixty-seven in the first year class.
A number of the courses formerly given have
been considerably enlarged and extended, and
new courses have been offered in Public
Utilities, Trusts, Administrative Law, and
Practice.
The faculty has been increased from four
to five full time teachers. The new position
was filled in September, 1921, by the appoint-
ment of Maurice Taylor Van Hecke, Ph. B.,
J. D., as associate professor of law. Mr.
Van Hecke did his undergraduate work at
Beloit College and the University of Chicago,
and received his legal training at the University
of Chicago Law School. For a time, he
practiced law in Chicago, and then served for
three years as a member of the legal staff of
the Illinois Legislative Reference Bureau.
During 1920-21, he held the position of
assistant professor of law in West Virginia
University. He has charge of the courses in
Private Corporations, Equity II, Evidence,
Use of Law Books, Public Utilities, and
Statutes, and is editor-in-charge of THE
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Assistant Professor Oscar Ogburn Efird,
A. M. LL.B., resigned early last summer to
enter private practice in Winston-Salem.
The vacancy thus created was filled in Sep-
tember, 1921, by the appointment of Robert
H. Wettach, A. M., LL.B., S. J. D., as
assistant professor of law. Mr. Wettach re-
ceived his collegiate and professional train-
ing at the University of Pittsburgh. After
some experience in the practice of law in
that city, he entered the graduate course in
the Harvard Law School, and received his
doctor's degree from that school last June.
He will give the courses in Criminal Law,
Persons, Negotiable Instruments, Agency,
Sales, and Conflicts of Laws, and will have
charge of the Law Clubs.
The other three members of the faculty
are well known to the North Carolina Bar.
They are: Lucius Polk McGehee, A. B., who,
as professor of law and later as Dean, has
been connected with the School of Law, with
the exception of one year, since 1904; Pat-
rick Henry Winston, professor of law since
1909; and Atwell Campbell McIntosh, A. Al.,
who came to the School from Trinity Col-
lege as professor of law in 1910. Mr. Mc-
Gehee has charge of the courses in Property
I and II, Constitutional Law, and Adminis-
trative Law. Mr. Winston gives the courses
in Torts, Equity I, Partnerships, Wills, Insur-
ance, Practice, and Trusts. Mr. McIntosh has
the courses in Contracts, Common Law
Pleading, Equity Pleading, Procedure Under
the Code, Municipal Corporations, Federal
Courts, and Bankruptcy.
In December, 1920, the School became a
member of the Association of American Law
Schools, an association of some fifty-six of
the leading law schools in the United States
and Canada, dedicated to the improvement of
legal education in America. The School was
represented at the December, 1921, meeting
of the Association by Messrs. McGehee, Van
Hecke and Wettach. In February, 1922, Mr.
McGehee represented the School at the Wash-
ington Conference on Legal Education of
Delegates of State and Local Bar Asso-
ciations.
The summer session of the School will
open June 15th and extend until just prior to
the bar examinations in August. The sum-
mer faculty will consist of four of the regular
members of the faculty of the School, and
'Associate justice Walter Parker Stacy, of
the North Carolina Supreme Court.
The new home of the School of Law is
described elsewhere in this issue.
THE NEW LAW BUILDInG--By a happy co-
incidence, the REvIEw is able to announce, in
its first number, that before the end of the
academic year 1922-1923, the new Law Build-
ing authorized by the last legislature will be
ready for occupancy. The School will go out
of its present cramped and almost impossible
quarters with a profound sense of relief and
satisfaction. The present Law Building,
though beautiful architecturally, is utterly in.
adequate for the special purposes of the
School. It can, however, be advantageously
devoted to some other need of the University
-perhaps to the theatre so earnestly desired
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by Professor Koch for the Carolina Play-
makers. How wretched the present accomo-
dations of the School and library are, how
disheartening the conditions of work have
been, only those can realize who have strug-
gled on with the existing equipment. It is
with the greatest gratitude and pride that the
School sees before it a new era of improved
facilities for work and usefulness.
As the goal of many years' exertions draws
near, it may be of interest to put on record
a short statement as to the previous homes of
the School. When the School was founded
by Judge William H. Battle eighty years ago,
it was conducted in one of the offices in the
yard of the present Battle house. At that
time the two offices, now both to the right
as one enters the yard, stood one on either side
of the entrance, and it was in the office on
the left that the School had its home from
1843 until some years after the Civil War.
When Dr. John Manning was elected to the
professorship of law in 1881, he moved to
Chapel Hill and established his law office and
the Law School in the small building on
Henderson Street, near the present post office,
now occupied by the telephone exchange.
The next home of the School was the room
directly opposite the main entrance on the
first floor of the Old South Building. It
moved into these quarters after Dr. Manning's
death in 1899, when the School was finally
and formally absorbed into the University.
From this room it passed, about 1907, during
the Deanship of Judge James C. McRae, to
the present Law Building, which had been
previously the University Library. Now at
last the School is to have a permanent home
adequate for its needs and worthy of its long
history and the devoted part its alumni have
played in the development of the University.
The new Law Building will stand north-
west of the Emerson Stadium, forming the
eastern end of a quadrangle opening toward
the west, the north and south sides of which
will be the new Social Science and Language
Buildings. This group will occupy the place
now used for tennis courts south of the Steele
Dormitory and the Gymnasium. With the
Steele Dormitory and other buildings to be
erected in line with that dormitory to the
south, the Law, Social Science and Language
buildings will ultimately form the eastern
side of the mall or avenue extending south
from the South Building and designed to form
the central axis of the new campus.
The Law Building, facing toward the mall,
will extend north and south about 140 feet
with a depth of 40 feet. The plans sholV an
impressive and graceful building in the
colonial Georgian style of architecture.
Looking at it from the front, the eye will be
arrested by a portico rising the entire height
of the building, supported by six Ionic
columns. The sky-line of the roof wilt be
broken by a colonial cupola. The outside ma-
terial of the building will be brick finished
with Indiana limestone. It will be built in
the fire-proof reinforced concrete type of con-
struction, a matter of especial importance as
it will be the permanent home of the law
library.
The ground plan of the building will in-
clude three parts; a central section 48 feet
long, and two wings each about 47 feet long.
There will be a well lighted basement, above
which will rise two floors surmounted by a
mezzanine floor.
The basement, entered by the stairways
descending from the two ends of the entrance
hall on the main floor, will contain, immedi-
ately under the entrance hall, space for lock-
ers for the students' books and coats. Under
one wing will be a large room where the
students may rest, without feeling that they
are in the way or obstructing work, when
they are not attending lectures or working in
the library. The importance of this student's
room is especially emphasized. It will relieve
the upper parts of the building, lecture-rooms,
library, reading-rooms, passages and halls
from noise and will help to develop an
atmosphere of study and industry in connec-
tion with the portions of the building devoted
to serious work. It must be remembered, too,
that the Law Building will be the exclusive
workshop and home of the students from the
time that lectures begin in the morning until
the building is closed at night, and the success
of the School is dependent upon the atmosp~here
of professional study and discussion developed
about and associated with that building. The
other wing of the basement will be devoted
to storage rooms and toilets.
Entering the main floor, the student will find
himself in an entrance hall, extending across
the front of the central part of the building,
48 feet long, with a width of 24 feet. At
each end of this will be stairways descending
into the basement and rising upward to the
library floor. This hall will contain four
pillars supporting the library floor above. Be-
hind this entrance hall, and occupying the re-
mainder of the central section of the building
will be a lecture room for small classes, 48
feet long by 15 feet wide. At each end of
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the entrance hall and opening into it will b
a leture room about 46 feet by 40 feet.
These rooms will be lighted by four large
windows in each side. There will be no
windows in the wall next the central section
of the building, nor in the end opposite. This
is so in order that neither the students nor
the instructor may have to face the light
directly. The lecturer's desk is placed at the
inside end of the room. The rooms will be
fitted with concentric rows of seats, the backs
of each row being provided with a shelf or
simple desk for the row behind, so that the
student may have room to spread out before
him his notebook and casebook or textbook.
The second floor, access to which is by
stairways at the ends of the entrance hall,
is given up to the library, reading rooms, and
administrative offices of the School, and to a
woman's room with its necessary accessories.
The space between the stairways on the second
or library floor will be devoted to the office
and desk of the librarian. From this central
position the librarian will be able to see
what is going on in the reading rooms and to
maintain a general supervision of the whole
floor.
The library floor is lighted by windows at
the sides and ends of the building and by
small skylights. In the stack room the main
light will be artificial. The ceiling height of
the library, including the mezzanine floor,
will be about 21 feet. One of the wings on
this floor will be devoted to the stack room
of the library. This will be fitted with steel
stacks providing space, with the use of the
mezzanine above, for 25,000 volumes. The
stack room will be flanked on each side toward
the front and rear of the building with small
offices for the accommodations of the Dean
and for the administrative work of the School.
This wing will also contain the woman's
room, and toilet facilities for the instructors
and librarian.
Immediately in front of the librarian's desk,
occupying the rest of the central section of
the building will be a reading room 24 by 48
feet. This room will not provide enough
space for the necessary accomodations of in-
structors, students and others, engaged in
study or research work in the library, but for
some years the space in the wing opposite
that used as a stack room will be devoted
wholly or in part to a reading room and to a
room for the editorial work incident to the
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Ultimately, when it is needed, it is hoped
that the building as originally designed may
be completed. The original plan includes a
semi-circular apse at the back of the central
section of the building with a radius of 24
feet. The first floor of this apse, added to the
small lecture room on the main floor, of which
mention has been made,' will when completed
provide a large lecture room and assembly
hall for the entire School, suited for use
either as a class-room, a room for general
lectures, or for other special occasions. The
second floor of the apse, added to the smaller
central reading-room will, when erected, afford
an entirely adequate and well lighted reading
room for the library. This will release the
second floor of the other wing, now to be
used as a reading room, for additional stack
space for the library. It was found inadvis-
able to construct this apse at the present time,
but the plan of construction provides for its
erection, when the growth of the School re-
quires it. L. P. McG.
WIFE'S SEPARATE ACTION FOR PERSONAL IN-
JURY To HUsBAN--In Hipp v. Dupont,' the
Supreme Court of North Carolina holds that
a personal injury to the husband, caused by
the negligence of a third person, entitles the
wife to maintain an action in her own name
for the consequent loss to her of the husband's
consortium. As this is the first case in which
this result has been reached, although the
question has arisen in several other courts,
the ground of decision ought to be carefully
examined.
At common law, of course, no such ques-
tion could arise or was conceivable. The wife
could not sue in her own name under any cir-
cumstances, and if she could have sued and
recovered, the recovery would have inured to
the husband. Her position at common law
was one of frank inferiority. Upon marriage,
she not only lost the capacity to sue, but the
marriage operated as an assignment to the
husband of her immediate property rights.
This state of things, however, has long
passed. By the doctrine of a "married wo-
man's separate equitable estate," elaborated
during the eighteenth century by the English
Court of Chancery, the wife ftho enjoyed a
marriage settlement was enabled to retain
her own property free from her husband's
control. The nineteenth century, under the
influence of a quickened perception of right
and social justice and a deepened feeling of
responsibility for social wrong, worked for
the complete emancipation of woman and to
raise her to a position of equality with man.
1182 N. C. 9, 108 S. E. 318 (1921).
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
It was only just before the dawn of that
century in 1792, that her sense of wrong and
her aspirations first found articulate ex-
pression in Mary Wolstoncraft's Vindication
of the Rights of Women. But by the middle
of the century, legislatures under the influ-
ence of a deeping conviction, began to enact
the married women's acts now almost uni-
versal, which gave her a legal title to her
own property and a right to sue. Under these
statutes, cases began to arise which required
the courts to re-examine the relation of hus-
band and wife and the rights of the parties.
The latest is the case under discussion.
In the Hipp case, the wife was allowed to
recover for pecuniary losses sustained and ex-
penses incurred, services rendered and main-
tenance lost in consequence of the injury, and
also for mental anguish and loss of consor-
tium. The court recognizes that the relation
of husband and wife is now a relation of en-
tire eqtiality; that technical obstacles to an
action by her have been removed, so that if
she has a right she can assert it; and it finds
in loss of consortium and the other losses
stated, a legal cause of action.
So far as her pecuniary losses are estab-
lished, including mental anguish under the
recognized doctrine in North Carolina, it is
hard to see how any other result could be
reached. These injuries appear to be the
direct result of the defendants wrongful act.
But a different question is presented with
respect to losses resulting to the wife be-
cause her husband's weakened physical condi-
tion rendered him less able to support her,
and because his consortium was less satisfac-
tory than before the injury. In his own
action for personal injuries, he recovers or is
supposed to recover complete indemnity for
his own decreased earning power, and the
wife's loss (apart from definite pecuniary in-
juries, nursing and extra expenditures) is .
mere consequence of wrongs for which he
has received compensation, which is shared
in part by her. To allow her another separate
action would be to give a double recovery for
one wrong. Her losses are remote and con-
sequential. With regard to her husband's
consortium, it is not the natural and probable
consequence of a physical injury to decrease
the society, companionship and affection be-
tween the spouses; and loss which results to
See Whitcomb v. N. Y., etc., R. R., 215 Mass.
440, 102 N. E. 663 (1913); Blair v. Seitner Dry
Goods Co., 184 Mich. 304, 151 N. W. 724 (1915);
and rs to mental anguish, see Bailey v. Long, 172
N. C. 661, 90 S. E. 809 (1916).
her can only be because the consorthuni of
which she is still in the enjoyment is less
satisfactory and valuable than formerly. It
is remote and consequential. Such is the
reasoning of the cases now to be considered.
Courts which have reached a conclusion
opposed to the Hipp case and which deny a
right of recovery in the wife for personal
injuries to the husband, for loss of main-
tainance due to decreased earning power and
for loss of consortium, include the highest
courts of Massachusetts, Indiana, Ohio, Mary-
land, and Missouri, and lower courts in new
York and Illinois. These cases, of which the
leading case is the Feneff case, postulate, as
does the Hipp case, the equality of hus-
band and wife and her right to sue. But
recovery is denied as opposed to two funda-
mental rules of law: separate recoveries for
a single cause of action, and recovery for re-
mote and consequential damages. Two lines
of precedents were considered in these cases.
In one, married women were allowed damages
for direct and intentional invasions of their
rights to the consortium of the husband, such
as actions for criminal conversation with the
husband or for alienating his affections. Ac-
tions for injuries to consortium of this type
are recognized in all jurisdictions." The
other class of precedents consists of those al-
lowing the husband to recover consequential
damages for loss of consortium arising from
personal injuries negligently inflicted on the
wife. This was an old common lav action.
Under the modern doctrine of equality of
husband and wife does such an action still
exist? This is crucial. If recognized as ex-
isting for the husband, it ought to exist for
the wife; if it is not recognized in favor of
the wife, no such action should exist for the
husband. In considering the question, actions
for intentional direct invasion of consortium
3Feneff v. N. Y. Cent., etc., R. R. Co. 203 Mass.
278, 89 N. E. 436 (1909); Gearing v. Berkson 223
Mass. 257, 111 N. E. 785 (1916); Brown v. kitle-
man, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N. E. 631 (1912); Smith v.
Nicholas Building Co., 93 Ohio St. 101 112 N. E.
204 (1915); Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Rd. 192, 104
At. 538 (1918); Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612,
208 S. W. 462 (1919); Uoldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc.(N. Y.) 336 63 N. Y . S. 459 (1900); Potelski v.
Snyder, 179 ill. App. 24 (1913).
' Nolin v. Pearson 191 Mass. 283, 77 N. E. 890
(1906); Turner v. i-eavrin, 182 Ky. 65, 206 S. W.
23 (1918). In both of these cases the authorities
are collected and examined. In North Carolina
such action is recognized. Brown v. Brown, 124
N. C. 19, 32 S. E. 320 (1899). Action for wilfully
and knowingly selling morphine to the husband, a
drug addict, has been held within this principle.
Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N. E.
102 (1912).
5 Grey v. Livesay, Cr. Jac. 501 (1619); subnow.
Grey v.-Lusq, 2 Rlle 551.
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have no bearing,' since as has been seen,
direct intentional invasion is generally recog-
nized as giving a cause of action.
In many jurisdictions, the common law
action in favor of the husband is still recog-
nized; in most courts, perhaps, in deference
to precedent.' But according to a well
reasoned series of recent cases, such an action
can no longer be maintained by the husband,
for the same reasons which prevent the wife
recovering under similar circumstances.'
In Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., supra,
it was held, following the Feneff case, that
there could be no recovery by the husband for
mere loss of wife's consortium (affection,
companionship and marital society), through
negligent personal injury to her, merely
rendering her society less valuable and satis-
factory; but recovery was allowed for definite
and ascertainable pecuniary loss for services
habitually performed. Of course, like the
wife, he may maintain an action for direct
intentional invasion of the consortium, such
as criminal conversation or alienation of affec-
tions.
The correctness of the reasoning of the
opposing cases depends, not assuredly as sug-
gested in the Hipp case on the common law
doctrines of merger of wife's identity and her
incapacity to sue, or on the recognition of a
right to consequential damages in the husband
not allowed to the wife. Nor does it depend
on a "clinging to consuetudinary law after the
reason for the custom has ceased," because
these cases are founded on a thorough and
careful attempt by able courts to apply the
new idea of equality to the marital relation.
The real ground for divergence of opinion is
'Thus, Flandermayer v. Cooper, supra, being
specifically based on direct invasion of consortium.
So, too, Holleman v. Harward, 119 N. C. 150, 25
S. E. 972 (1896), (husband allowed to recover foi
damages for sale of drugs to wife, an addict).
These cases are relied on in Hip pv. Dupont. See
Jaynes v. Jaynes, 39 Hun (N. Y.) 40 (1886),(wife's action for alienation of affections), also re-
lied on in Hipp case.
' Mageau v. Great Northern R. R. Co., 103 Minn.290, 115 N. W. 651 (1908); it is recognized in
North Carolina; Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N. C.
398, 55 S. E. 778 (1906); Bailey v. Long, supra.
In commenting on these North Carolina cases in
the Hipp case, the court distinguishes the right of
recovery of the husband for the wife's earnings,
in case of injury to her, of which statutes have de.
prived him, and for the loss of the companionship
of his wife, which is "a loss purely personal to
him and the direct consequence of the wrong of
the defendant." The consequential character of the
loss as already involved in the husband's right of
recovery is of course denied. See also Guevin v.
Manchester St. Ry. Co., 78 N. H. 289, 99 Ad. 298(1916).
sMarri v. Stamford St. Ry. Co., 84 Conn. 9, 78
Atl. 582 (1911); Bolger v. Boston El. R. Co., 205
Mass. 420, 91 N. E. 389 (1910); Whitcomb v. N. Y.
etc. R. Co., 215 Mass. 440, 102 N. E. c663 (1913).
whether the recognized common law principle
of remoteness of damages is applicable.
The Hipp case says: "Our precedents
establish that such damages are not remote
for the husband, and on parity of reasoning
they are not remote for the wife."
The opposing cases say: "Such damages
can be recovered by neither spouse. To allow
the wife to recover for merely consequential
unintentional losses resulting from negligent
injury to the husband is opposed to the
principle refusing consequential and remote
damages and is not supported by any analo-
gous line of cases. Old precedents allowing
the husband to recover for injuries to the wife
avail nothing, as they are founded on a bar-
barous exploded theory of the husband's own-
ership of the wife at a time when she was
considered an inferior." L. P. McG.
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANcE-The Beech-
Nut Case was brought to the Supreme Court
of the United States on certiorari proceedings
from the Circuit Court of Appeals, the ques-
tion at issue being the authority of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission under sec. 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, to order the
Beech-Nut Packing Co. to desist from carry-
ing out a certain sales policy whereby standard
prices were maintained on its products in the
hands of dealers at wholesale and at retail. '
From the agreed statement of facts pre-
sented to it, the Court selected the following
for mention in its review of the case: The
Company refused to sell its products to those
who did not maintain the resale prices sug-
gested by it. It also refused to sell to those
who sold to others who had failed to main-
tain those suggested prices. It refused to
sell to mail-order houses, or to dealers who
sold its products to mail-order houses. It
employed "specialty salesmen" who solicited
"turn-over orders" directly from retailers,
but permitted such orders to be filled only by
wholesalers who maintained the prices. It
reinstated distributors previously cut off upon
promises and assurances that they would sup-
port the company's price policy. New dis-
tributors were added to the list only upon
similar assurances. In addition, the Company
utilized a system of key numbers or symbols
marked upon the cases of "Beech-Nut Brand
Products," so that in the event of price
irregularities, the identity of the offending
dealers might readily be traced. It also main-
tained card records "containing the names of
thousands of jobbing, wholesale and retail
% Federal Trade Commission v. Beech.Nut Pack.
ing Co. 42 Sup. Ct. 150 (1922).
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distributors, and . . . . listed upon those cards
.... the words 'Undesirable-Price Cutters,'
'Do Not Sell,' . . . . or expressions of a like
character, to indicate hat the particular dis-
tributor was in the future not to be supplied
with respondent's goods on account of failure
to maintain the suggested retail prices ....
Additional card records x'ere kept of 'select-
ed' distributors."
The decision of the Court, while sustaining
in general the "cease and desist order" of the
Federal Trade Commission, nevertheless, does
not in any way impair the right of the com-
pany to refuse to sell its products to any one
whomsoever, or its right to determine the
circumstances under which it will sell or de-
cline to sell.
Some of the critics of the case have ex-
pressed inability to take the above view of its
effect, and have maintained that the Court
in pronouncing the "Beech-Nut Policy" illegal,
has taken a position inconsistent with that
taken by the same tribunal in other recent
cases involving similar issues. It has been
contended that the agreed statement of facts
upon which the decision was based brought
the case within the Colgate Case, discussed
later in this note, but that the Court arrived
at an opinion adverse to the Colgate decision
without overruling it or questioning it, or
"recognizing any inconsistency in the two
positions."'  Elsewhere, it is stated, follow-
ing a generally adverse criticism of the
Court's opinion, that "In effect, the Court has
nullified a desirable exception to a question-
able rule," the "questionable" rule by impli-
cation being that laid down in the Colgate
Case relative to the right to refuse to sell!
Reply to these criticisms will best follow a
summary of prior cases involving price main-
tenance as the major issue.
In the case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park and Sons Co.,' it was held that
specific contracts between manufacturer and
dealers to maintain certain resale prices were
unenforceable on grounds of public policy.
The theory of the Court then expressed, and
subsequently adhered to, was: "The com-
plainant having sold his products at prices
satisfactory to himself, the public is entitled
to whatever advantage may be derived from
competition in the subsequent traffic."
In Bauer v. O'Donnell,' the famous "San-
atogen Case," the question at issue was:
231 Yale L. 3. 653.
3 35 Harv. Law Rev. 772.
4220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376 (1911).
'229 U. S. 1 (1913).
May a patentee by notice limit the price at
which future retail sales of the patented ar-
ticles may be made, such article being in the
hands of a retailer by purchase from a jobber
who has paid the agent of the patentee the
full price asked for the article sold? The
Court in its negative answer reiterated the
doctrine of the former case.
A still different type of attempt to coerce
dealers into acceptance of standard resale
prices, by use of a so-called "license notice"
was frustrated by the Court in Straus v.
Victor Talking Machine Co.' In a con-
temporaneous decision concerning motion pic-
tures, the averseness of the Court to the idea
of the manufacturer's control over his
products, after their sale, goes so far as to
achieve a complete overthrow of the well-
known Dick Case,' until that time one of
the legal main-stays of attempted price con-
trol by patentees.
The next case to come before the Court,
Boston Store of Chicago v. American Grapho-
phone Co' is of interest because of its com-
prehensive review of the legal doctrines in-
volved in price maintenance contracts. Rela-
tive to the question before it, the Court
said: ". . . . There is no room for contro-
versy concerning the subjects to which the
questions relate, as every doctrine which is
required to be decided in answering the ques-
tions is now no longer open to dispute . .. ."
It was at this juncture, when the prohibition
of resale price maintenance seemed well es-
tablished and when the proponents of resale
price maintenance seemed c~nvinced that no
remedy was available for them except "the
curative power of legislation," that relief
apparently arrived in the form of the Colgate
Case.
In the bill of indictment, the Colgate Co.
was charged with having attempted to main-
tain resale prices through the method of re-
fusing to sell to price-cutting dealers, the re-
fusal-to-sell action being in accordance with
previously published announcements to that
effect. No mention was made in the indict-
ment of contracts with dealers, express or
implied, or of any "follow-up" system de-
signed to discover and report non-complying
dealers. In a later reference to this case, the
court declared that, "the only act charged
e243 U. S. 490 (1917).
I Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Manufacturing Co., 243 U. S. 502 (1917); Henry v.
Dick Co. 224 U. S. 1 (1912).
'246 U. S. 8, 38 Sup. Ct. 257 (1918).
9 U. S. v. Colgate Co., 250 U. S. 300, 39 Sup.
Ct. 465 (1919).
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amounted to the exercise of the right of the
trader or manufacturer . . . .to exercise his
own discretion as to those with whom he
would deal, and to announce the circumstances
under which he would refuse to sell." '0 The
Court was emphatic in declaring the conduct,
as thus described, legitimate. Moreover, it
took occasion later, in the cases of U. S. v.
Schrader's Son, Inc.,' and Frey & Co. v.
Cudahy Packing Co.,' to reaffirm its legality,
although each of the latter cases involved
refusal-to-sell methods which were pronounced
illegal. The distinction lay in the existence
of implied agreements.
The above cases constitute the legal back-
ground of the Beech-Nut Case. They clearly
foreshadowed defeat for the Beech-Nut sell-
ing methods as described in the beginning of
this discussion, unless the Company's methods
could be established as identical with those
of the Colgate policy. However, the Court
properly refused to admit any such identity,
holding that the respondent's plan of mark-
eting while including the practices of the
Colgate Co., yet went much further in that
it utilized a closely-knit and effectively ap-
plied follow-up system in connection with its
selling, in which jobbers, retailers, and the
agents of the company participated. In
short, it was an elaborate espionage system
in which an army of individuals both in and
out of the employ of the Beech-Nut Packing
Co. were under pressure to observe and to re-
port to the Company, each upon the actions of
the others. If coiperative action of this type
is not to be regarded as conspiracy in restraint
of trade and therefore an unfair method of
competition within the meaning of see. 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, then con-
spiracy has no meaning in American busi-
ness law.
To any one familiar with the problems and
intricacies involved in the competitive mark-
eting of manufactured goods, it is incompre-
hensible that the rule of free choice of cus-
tomers as pronounced in the Colgate decision
should be regarded as a "questionable rule."
The only alternative to such a rule in prac-
tice would be compulsory sales to whomso-
ever would buy, which would preclude the
possibility of manufacturer selecting his own
channels of commodity distribution. Free
choice of the agencies of distribution is es-
sential in many instances to efficient market-
0 Reference in Beech-Nut decision, 42 Sup. Ct.
150 (1922).
u 252 U. S. 85, 40 Sup. Ct. 251 (1920).
"256 U. S. 208, 41 Sup. Ct. 451 (1921).
ing for reasons wholly outside price-main-
tenance considerations.
The doctrine as laid down in the Beech-
Nut Case, far from being an undesirable ex-
ception to the above rule, is neither an ex-
ception nor undesirable. It does not limit
the choice of customers, but merely invali-
dates certain designated methods of procur-
ing the information upon which the choice is
made. The fact that certain manufacturers
find it difficult to procure the desired informa-
tion without the use of the prescribed meth-
ods is wholly aside from the question. The
same objection may be directed against the
illegality of any procedure which stands in
the way of easy accomplishment of an end
legitimate in itself.
From the economic point of view, tha
Beech-Nut decision has made the legal status
of price maintenance more equitable." Had
this case been brought within the scope of
the Colgate ruling, it would have created a
situation in which only the more powerful
of specialty manufacturers could have effect-
ed price control, for only this type could
afford the elaborate and broadly-based follow-
up system of espionage and reporting requi-
site to success. Admittedly, the law is not
presumed to be cognizant of the mere size
of a business, unless monopoly is attained or
attempted. But in the eventuality above sug-
gested, business men would have faced the
fact that every known method of attaining
price maintenance would have been by court
ruling made illegal, except the one method
which is effective only in the hands of the
largest interests. The application of the
Colgate rule to the Beech-Nut Case would at
once have rendered farcial all prior rulhigs
of the Court relative to resale price main-
tenance contracts. It would have been tanta-
mount to legitimatizing the use of Big
Berthas in war while forbidding the use of
one-pounders.
At present all manufacturers may be said
to occupy the same position as regards the
practical as well as the theoretical aspects
of resale price maintenance. Price control to
the extent of preVenting the extreme instances
of price-cutting in the main still remains
wholly feasible. Price control in its most
rigid form has been rendered virtually im-
possible, an end highly desirable economi-
cally." The principle of freedom of choice
3?Cf. Kales, Contracts and Combinations in Re-
straint of Trade.
"For the economic aspects of price mainten.
ance in detail, see Murchison, Resale Price Main-
tenance (1919), Columbia University Studies in
Political Science, Vol. 82, No. 2.
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in the selection of customers, than which no
principle of business law should be regarded
as more sacred, has been wholly preserved,
and at the same time rendered comparatively
free from abuse by elimination of certain
accessory devices in themselves "repressive and
contrary to public policy."'
C. T. MURCHISON
Associate Professor of Business Economics,
University of North Carolina
DIMINUTION OF JUDGES' SALARIES BY AN
INCOME TAX-The Constitution of North
Carolina 1 provides that "the salaries of thejudges shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office." Similar provisions are
found in the federal Constitution and in the
constitutions of many of the states. Under
these clauses the question has arisen whether
the government is prohibited from applying a
general income tax to the salaries of judges.
One view is that such a tax does not'diminish
these salaries within the meaning of the Con-
stitution, but that it constitutes merely a
means of distributing the cost of the govern-
ment equally over the general mass of citi-
zens. On the other hand, the proposition that
a general income tax is inapplicable to judicial
salaries under a constitutional provision
against diminution is strongly upheld in most
jurisdictions.'
The first view suggested was adopted in an
early Pennsylvania case, and has recently re-
ceived support in Wisconsin." The strength
of the first case, is of course, somewhat im-
paired by the briefness of the opinion and by
the fact that no authorities are cited in sup-
port of its holding. And it was virtually
overruled by a later case in the same juris-
diction.' Probably the ablest presentation of
the view that a general income tax does not
diminish the salaries of the judges within the
meaning of the constitution, is found in the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in
1 Cf. Brown, The Right to Refuse to Sell, 25
Yale L. J., 194.
1 Art. IV, see. 18.
2 It should be borne in mind that the proposition
under discussion has no direct connection with theproblem as to whether a state may tax the salary
of an officer of the Federal Government, and vice
versa. The solution of that problem depends upon
the considerations of policy involved in one sov-
ereignty taxing the agencies of another and not
upon the interpretation of such a constitutional
clause as that herein involved. See Collector v.
Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1870); Purnell v. Page, 133N. C. 125, 45 S. E. 534 (1903); and Gillespie v.Oklahoma, - U. S. - , 66 L. ed. 211 (adv.
ops., 1922).
" Commissioners v. Chapman, 2 Rawle (Pa.) 73(1829); State v. Nygaard, 159 Wis. 396, 150 N. W.
513 (1915).
4Commonwealth ex. rel. Hepburn v. Mann, 5
Watts & Serg. 403 (1843).
the recent case of Evans v. Gore,5 in the
Supreme Court of the United States. It is
there suggested that the salaries of federal
judges are, for two reaqons, subject to a gen-
eral federal income tax. In the first place, it
is said that the clause in the federal Constitu-
tion was intended to secure the independence
of the judges from legislative coercion, and
that to require them to pay the same income
taxes that all other men have to pay, could
not possibly influence their judicial action.
Moreover, it was felt to be unnecessary to
exempt the official salaries of judges as such
from taxation, while that part of those
salaries which has been converted into other
forms of property is made taxable.' In the
second place, the dissenting opinion urged, as
cannot be said in the state cases, that the
Sixteenth Amendment, which provides for the
taxation of incomes, "from whatever source
derived," authorizes the subjection of judicial
salaries to a general income tax, and that the
majority view on this phase of the case dis-
regards the probable significance of that
clause. '
The view, however, that judicial salaries
are not taxable under these diminution pro-
visions is supported by the great majority of
the decided cases.' The argument for this
position is that the power to tax is the power
to destroy, and that even the upholding of the
applicability of a relatively small and gen-
eral income tax might become a precedent
for a more direct and coercive measure. The
firmness with which that Iosition is main-
tained is emphasized by the fact that not
even the apparently explicit language of
"from whatever source derived" in the Six-
teenth Amendment was sufficient to overcome
it. The answer to this contention is that the
sustaining of the applicability to judicial
salaries of a general income tax could not
in the nature of things later preclude the
court from nullifying an actually harmful
tax, one that does come within the purview
of the Constitution, and that there will be
time and opportunity enough to grapple with
that situation when it arises.
In North Carolina, the attitude that judicial
salaries are non-taxable has long been prev-
alent, although it should be noted that here-
tofore the Court has not as such rendered an
5253 U. S. 264 (1920).
6 See 30 Yale L. 3. 75.
1 See 34 Harv. Law. Rev. 70.
8 See Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245 (1920); NewOrleans v. Lea, 14 La. Ann. 197 (1859), and cases
cited in State v. Nygaard, 159 Vis. 396, 150 N. V.
513 (1915).
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opinion on the question, but has simply re-
lied upon opinions submitted by the state
attorneys-general. In the recent North
Carolina case of Long v. Watts,"5 the ques-
tion was again presented whether or not a
general income tax is a diminution of the
judges' salaries within the constitutional pro-
hibition. One of the state Superior Court
judges brought an action to restrain the state
commissioner of revenue from collecting an
income tax on his official salary, alleging the
invalidity of such an application of the income
tax act of 1920.' The defendant contended
that since the constitutional amendment of
1920 regulating the rate of income taxes and
the exemptions therefrom, the official salaries
of judges were subject to taxation."
In an unanimous and somewhat vigorous
opinion the Court held that although the
private incomes and property of judges are
subject to taxation, their official salaries are
exempted. The decision is supported by the
clear weight of authority. As an original
question, however, and in view of the pur-
pose of the constitutional provision and the
considerations suggested by Mr. Justice
Holmes, the result would be unnecessary.
N. Y. P.
BANK'S LIABILITY FOR PAYMENT ON UN-
AUTHORIZED INDORSEMENT OF PAYEE'S NAME.
-A recent North Carolina case raises a
question as to the liability of a bank for pay-
ment of a check on an unauthorized indorse-
ment of the payee's name." The facts were
as follows: A owed C $1,000. A told C
that if the latter would loan him $3,000, he
would repay the $1,000, and give as security
a deed of trust on his sister B's land. This
was agreed to. C made the check payable to
B, whose name purported to be signed to the
trust deed, and delivered it to A, whereupon
he indorsed it "B by A," and deposited it to
his own credit in the defendant bank. Later, A
paid C the original debt by check on his
account. B had no notice or knowledge of
the transaction. C, upon discovering the
Opinion of Attorney General Batchelor, 48 N. C.,
Appendix. p. 544 (1856); Opinion of Attorney
General Walser N C. Pub. Doc., (1899) p 95; In
Re Taxation of Salaries of Judges, 131 1. C. 692,
42 S. E. 970 (1902).
'5 110 S. E. 765 (N. C. 1922).
P. L., 1921, Ch. 34.
"Constitution of North Carolina Art. V, sec. 3.
The effect of this amendment was simply to remove
the prohibition against taxing incomes derived from
property already taxed, to limit the maximum rate
of taxes upon incomes to 6 percent thereof, and to
specify certain exemptions.
I McKoughon v. Merchants Bank and Trust Co.,
182 N. C. 543, 109 S. E. 355 (1921).
fraud, seeks to hold the bank for payment of
the check on the unauthorized indorsement of
the payee's name. Held, plaintiff could re-
cover the difference between the face value
of the check and the amount repaid to him
by A.
A drawee bank is liable for payment on
the forged indorsement of a payee's name.'
It cannot charge the amount so paid to the
drawer's account, unless the latter has been
guilty of negligence causing the payment. It
may disburse only in conformity with the
drawer's directions.' Likewise, when a
drawee bank pays a check indorsed by an
agent, it must assure itself of his authority
at its peril.' Such authority may of course
be implied as a necessary incident to an actual
agency The Negotiable Instruments Act'
provides that no right can be acquired under a
signature made without the authority of the
person whose signature it purports to be,
"unless the party against whom it is sought
to enforce such right is precluded from set-
ting up the want of authority." The right of
action in this connection inures to the drawer
and not to the payee, because the check never
becomes the property of the payee.'
When the drawee bank complies with the
instructions of the drawer, it will be pro-
tected. So where A, representing himself as
B, obtains an instrument payable to B, the
drawer intends the person before him to be
payee, although he erroneously supposes that
person to be B.' Personal presence is a
surer means of identification than a name.9
Thus, the bank, having followed the drawer's
directions, should not be liable to him." But
where A, representing himself as B's agent,
obtains an instrument payable to B, notldng
else appearing, the drawer does not intend to
make A payee, nor to authorize A to indorse."
Here, the name is the only basis for identifi-
cation. Therefore, the bank will be liable for
2 Shipnzan v. Bank of State of New York, 126 N.
Y. 318, 27 N. E. 371 (1891); Yarborough v. Trust
Co., 142 N. C. 377, 55 S. E. 296 (1906).
See 22 Harv. Law Rev. 605.
'2 Bolles, Modern Law of Banking, 730; Bank
v. Hay, 143 N. C. 3?6, 55 S. E. 811 (1906).
"Where one merely professes authority to in.
dorse, which in fact does not exist, it is not forgery.
1 Mechem on Agency, 2nd ed. 266.
0 C. S., sec. 3003.
tFirst National Bank of Chicago v. Pease, 168
IIl. 40, 48 N. E. 160 (1897).
8See 14 Harv. Law Rev. 60. Elliott v. Smith.
erman, 19 N. C. 338 (1837). See 50 L. R. A. 75,
note.
'Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231, 4 N. E.
619 (1886).
"Land Title and Trust Co. v. Northwestern
National Bank, 196 Pa. St. 230, 46 Atl. 420 (1900).
"See 15 Harv. Law Rev. 152.
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payment on an unauthorized indorsement
thereof.'
The principal case, quite anomalously, par-
takes of the essence of both of these
situations. A represented himself to C as the
agent of B. But, as a matter of fact, C in-
tended that A should receive the proceeds of
the check. C was making the loan to A, and
at his request. C looked to him for payment
of the prior loan from those proceeds, and
delivered the check to him, payable to B,
without any reference to his authority as
agent. It seems this was but a nominal use
of B's name in the nature of a fictituous
payee." Would payment to A on his unau-
thorized indorsement of B's name be a com-
pliance with the drawer's intention and direc-
tion? To distinguish this from payment to
A where he has represented himself to C as
B ", is a close refinement. Where the drawee
pays on an unauthorized indorsement and the
proceeds find their way back to the drawer,
the former is not liable as for a wrongful
payment; the drawer is not damaged by the
payment1 Likewise, where money gets into
the hands of him whom the drawer intended
to designate as payee. 1" It is submitted that
the same rule should prevail when the money
gets into the hands of him whom the drawer
intended to receive it.' T The indorsement
and payment accord with the intention of the
drawer, and he might be estopped to complain
that he was injured thereby. It seems that in
the principal case the court should at least
have weighed these considerations against the
drawee's negligence in paying on an un-
authorized indorsement.
Moreover, it seems arguable that under
the particular circumstances here, the check
was payable to a fictitious payee." Section
2990 of the Consolidated Statutes of North
Carolina, provides, inter alia, that a check is
payable to a fictitious payee when "it is pay-
able to the order of a fictitious or non-exist-
ing person, and such fact was known to the
person making it so payable." This section
states the well settled rule that the intention
of the drawer determines the fictitious
"Armstrong v. Poineroy National Bank, 46 Ohio
St. 512, 22 N. E. 866 (1889).
1z See note 16, post.
14 See note 7, supra.
"3Andrews v. Northwestern National Bank, 107
Minn. 196, 117 N. W. 621 (1908).
1" See 14 Harv. Law Rev. 60.
11 See Banks and Banking, 7 C. J. Secs. 400, 414.
"Such check would be payable to bearer. C. S.
sec. 2990.
character of the payee." Where the payee
is a stranger to the transaction, and has no
interest therein, it has been held that he may
be regarded as a nonentity.' If the name of
the payee represents the real person entitled
to receive the amount of the check, and the
drawer intends that the check should be de-
livered to the real payee and should not go
into circulation otherwise than through de-
livery to and indorsement by the payee named,
then, the payee is not fictitious." The ficti-
tious character of the drawer's direction to pay
does not depend upon the identification of the
payee named with some existent person, but
upon the intention underlying the act of the
drawer in inserting the name. ' It seems
arguable that the drawer in the principal case
did not intend B to be the real payee.
The principal case allowed the drawer to re-
cover, but restricted the amount to the differ-
ence between the face value of the check and
the amount repaid to him by A. It seems
that when A wrongfully obtained the money
from defendant bank to pay C, he became a
constructive trustee thereof for the bank."
When C accepted it in payment of the prior
debt, he became a purchaser for value, and
without notice." Thus, he took it free of all
equities." The money was not the property
of the defendant bank, but became the
drawer's property, for which he paid value.
So the drawer's loss was not cured by the
payment from A. It seems, therefore, that
if the drawer was not precluded as above sug-
gested, he should have recovered the full
amount of the original check.
C. L. N.
THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN NORTH CARO-
LINA-"In the law of charitable trusts in
England and in all but a very few states,'
there prevails a principle called the doctrine
of cy pres. Under this doctrine, when prop-
erty is given for a particular charitable pur-
pose, and when that purpose becomes impos-
"i Coggil v. The American Exchange Bank, 1 X .
Y. 113 (1847).
20 Ibid.
' Shipman v..Bank of State of N. Y., 126 N. Y.
318, 27 N. E. 371 (1891).
"Phillips v. Mercantile National Bank, 140 N.
Y. 556, 35 N. E. 982 (1894).
"Newton v. Porter, 69 N. C. 133 (1877). See
19 IHarv. Law Rev. 55. Edwards v. Culberson, 111
N. C. 343, 16 S. E. 233 (1892).
24 Mechanic's Bank v. Chardavoyne, 69 N. J. L.
256, 55 Ad. 1080 (1903).
25 Nassau Bank v. Bank of Newburg, 159 N. Y.
456, 54 N. E. 66 (1899).
'The cases are collected in 5 L. R. A. 33, note,
6 ibid. 147, 14 L. R. A. (n. s.) 59, note, and 37
ibid. 1007, note.
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sible of accomplishment, the courts may au-
thorize the application of the property to
other charitable purposes, provided those other
purposes, as well as the expressed purpose,
fall within a more general charitable purpose
of the donor. The doctrine also applies when
the particular charitable purpose of the donor
is or becomes illegal."' This concept origi-
nated in mediaeval times, when, "as ....
pious donations were the price paid to Heaven
or to its more exacting broker, the Church,
for its favor, 'one kind of charity' would in-
deed have 'embalmed the testator's memory, as
well as another,' for his intent was not the
application of the purchase money, but the
delivery of the goods purchased ..... The
testator's paramount object being salvation,
the means were immaterial."'
The doctrine of cy pres is not, however,
recognized in North Carolina. This note in-
dicates the development of that attitude in
this state.
The pioneer North Carolina case on the
jurisdiction of a court of equity to enforce
a charitable trust, is Griffin v. Grahaim,' de-
cided in 1820. From the altogether sweeping
acceptance in that case of the complete juris-
diction of the English chancellors over chari-
table trusts, it might be inferred that the Court
would not have been unwilling, had the ques-
tion been before it, to recognize also, as a
corollary of that jurisdiction, the availability
of cy pres relief. Eight years later, how-
ever, in McAuley v. Wilson,' when the ques-
tion first aiose, the Court flatly repudiated the
doctrine of cy pres. This seems to have been
mainly because of the feeling that a court
ought not to make over a person's will in
the absence of proper proof that the alter-
ation would have had the testator's approval.
In other words, the view was that a court
ought to hesitate long before substituting for
the terms of the will a guess as to what the
deceased would have desired had he known
of the impediment in the way of carrying out
his expressed wish. This reasoning was aug-
mented in the case of Holland v. Peck," de-
cided in 1842, by the assertion that the doc-
trine of cy pres was admitted by the English
courts to be unsound, 'that many of the re-
sults in England had been revolting, and that
2 Austin W. Scott, Education and the Dead Hand,
34 Harv. Law Rev. 1, 5.
3Joseph Willard, Illustrations of the Origin of
Cy Pres, 8 Harv. Law Rev. 69, 91.
48 N. C. 96, 9 Am. Dec. 619 (1820).
5 16 N. C. 276, 18 Am. Dec. 587 (1828).
c37 N. C. 255 (1842).
the concept had never been accepted by any
of the American courts.
Although, as has been seen, most American
courts have now adopted' the cy prcs doc-
trine, the North Carolina view seems analyti-
cally correct. "That such a doctrine (that
of cy pres) should not only have survived the
state of society and of belief in which it origi-
nated, but should also have been developed
into an integral part of the jurisprudence
of a social order and faith radically diverse,
may occasion surprise. And a doubt may arise
whether in administering it, the peculiar cir-
cumstances of its beginning and development-
we might indeed say the necessary conditions
of its existence-are borne in mind; or
whether it is considered that the modern
testator, not intending a purchase of Heaven
with his 'bona caducis' but a specific bequest
to a specific charity, may be presumed to
have known not merely what he intended,
but what he did not intend, in the case of a
charity, as well as any testamentary disposi-
tion made by him; or that the court in im-
puting to him what he did not say, because he
might have said it, may not run some risk
of making him say what he would have em-
phatically repudiated."'
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has
had occasion to refer to and discuss the doc-
trine of cy pres in connection with some four
types of cases.
One situation has been that in which the tes-
tator has not designated with sufficient definite-
ness the beneficiaries of a charitable trust and
tho means to be used in its accomplishment.
While, on the one hand, the Court seems to
have become more liberal as to the exactness
with which these matters must be fixed by
the terms of the will, the view is firmly main-
tained that the doctrine of cy pres may not be
resorted to in North Carolina to enable the
Court to uphold the trust by supplying the
omissions mentioned.'
Another has been the case where the funds
available were insufficient to accomplish the
full intent of the testator. The fact that
the doctrine of cy pres is not recognized has
not operated, in this situation, to prevent the
application of the funds, as far as possible,
to the purpose set forth in the will. As the
' See note 1, supra.
'See note 3, supra.
" Holland v. Peck, 37 N. C. 255 (1842); Bridgej
v. Pleasants, 39 N. C. 26, 44 Am. Dec. 94 (1845);
Taylor v. Ant. Bible Society, 42 N. C. 201 (1857);
Keith v. Scaes, 124 N. C. 497, 32 S. E. 809 (1899).
Amid see note 14, post. Cf. Fairbault v. Taylor, 58
N. C. 219 (1859), in which, however, no charitable
trust was involved.
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Court said in a recent case," "this is not the
doctrine of the cy pres, which is to apply
the sum to some other purpose 'equally as
good,' but is the application of the fund to
the very purpose named, as far as it will
go,fti
1
The third case has been that in which some
obstruction has arisen to make it impossible
to carry out the expressed purpose of the
testator. Here the Court has been compelled
to decree, that as to the property involved, the
donor died intestate, "for we do not, as they
do in England, apply it to other objects of a
similar kind, by what is called the doctrine
of cy pres."'
And the same result has obtained where the
trust was for an illegal purpose.
In the recent North Carolina case of
Wachovia Bank and Trust Company v. Og-
burn," the facts were these: Three hundred
acres of land, known as Vade Mecum Springs,
and $209,000 were "to be set apart and held
in trust to conserve, protect and beautify said
property, contribute to the construction of
suitable roads to and through the premises as
well as to a railroad . . . .and erect thereon
a commodious and permanent auditorium or
assembly room for the meeting and gathering
of educational, religious, scientific, medicinal
or other worthy organizations or associations.
My object and hope being that the same may
be developed into and become not only a
watering resort, but an institution after the
order of a chautauqua." The heirs contended
that the trust was invalid on the grounds,
among others, that the beneficiaries and the
details of the plans had not been named
with sufficient definiteness, and that the funds
available were insufficient to carry out fully
the wishes expressed in the will. The trust
was held valid, however, the Court saying:
"It is sufficient if the testator describes de-
finitely the general nature of the trust. He
may leave the details of its execution to the
trustee under the superintendence of the court
of equity. A gift to charity is complete with-
out reference to any of the suggestions or
directions of the testator as to the details of
the manner in which it shall be carried into
effect, . provided the objects are specific
10 Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Ogburn, 181
N. C. 324, 328, 107 S. E. 238 (1921).
11 University v. Gatling, 81 N. C. 508 (1879);
Paine v. Forney, 128 N. C. 237, 38 S. E. 885(1901). And see note 14, post.
UMcAuley v. Wilson, 16 N. C. 276, 18 Am.
Dec. 587 (1828); Trustees v. Chambers, 56 N. C.
253 (1857).
VLemnmond v. Peoples, 41 N. C. 137 (1848).
34 181 N. C. 324, 107 S. E. 238 (1921).
enough that the Court by decree can effectu-
ate them ..... It is true that the doctrine of
cy pres is not recognized in this state, and
it is not called for here simply by the fact that
ihe testator wisely did not attempt to work
out all the details of the plan which he knew
must be modified by future developments."
It was presumed that the trustee would "cut
the coat according to the cloth" and the funds
in hand were applied as far as they would go,
toward carrying out the contemplated pro-
ject. This result is in accord with the deci-
sions and dicta in the first and second groups
of cases noted above. R. R.
RISK oF Loss WHSERE SELLER RErAINS
SECURITY TITLE. ' "In a transaction of a pur-
chase of goods where nothing is to be done,
the price agreed upon and nothing said about
payment or delivery, the property passes at
once and the future risk is put upon the pur-
chaser, although he cannot take the goods
away before he pays the price.".? In Jenkins
v. Jarrett,' there was a contract for the sale
of a horse, with no stipulation as to payment
or delivery. The court applied the principle
involved in the quotation, holding that title
passed to the purchaser immediately although
he could not take away the horse without
paying the price. In these cases, there is no
reservation of title, but the seller retains
possession of the goods to secure payment
of the purchase price. It is correctly assumed
that the risk of loss accompanies the owner-
ship of the goods, that it is upon the seller
until the property in the goods passes to the
buyer, and that after title passes, it is upon
the buyer.
A conditional sale gives rise to a more
difficult situation. Suppose the ordinary case
in which the seller delivers property to the
buyer under an agreement that the seller'shall
retain title until the price is paid. Before the
time of payment, the property is destroyed.
Should the loss fall upon the seller merely
because he holds the legal title? Some courts'
'This discussion is based very largely on North
Carolina decisions, because the Sales Act has settled
the difficulty in the states which have adopted it.
For a general discussion of the whole question, see:
Williston, Sales, sec. 274 et seq., particularly 284,
304, 305; Williston, Progress of the Law, 34 Harv.
Law Rev. 741; Williston, The Risk of Loss After
an Executory Contract of Sale in the Common Law,
9 Harv., Law Rev. 106; Benjamin, Sales, 6th ed.
419-467; Tiffany, Sales, 162-173.
2Richardson v. Insurance Company, 136 N. C.
314, 48 S. E. 733 (1904).
3Jenkins v. Jarrett, 70 N. C. 255 (1874).
4 Glisson v. Heggie, 105 Ga. 30, 31 S. E. 118(1898); Soda Fountain Co. v. Blue, 146 Ala. 682,
40 So. 218 (1906).
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have so held. A consideration of the nature
of the transa.cion will give us the answer.
"A conditional sale is a sale, but upon con-
dition, in -which the purchaser sustains the
relation of the mortagor and the seller that of
the mortgagee. And a discharge of the debt
-the condition-by the purchaser is a dis-
charge of the lien of the seller."' In other
words, it is exactly as if the seller sold the
goods to the buyer and the buyer gave the
seller a chattel mortgage back as security for
the payment of the price.' In Puffer v.
Lucas,' the seller brought an action for
possession of a soda fountain, which had been
sold to the defendant under a so-called lease.
The lease called for a certain amount of rent
in installments, title to vest in the lessee when
full payment was made. The court correctly
held that this was a conditional sale, although
called a lease, and that since about four-fifths
of the installments had been paid, it would be
"contrary to the fundamental principles ob-
served in courts of equity" to allow the lessor
(seller) to take the property and declare all
payments forfeited. The court decided, how-
ever, that the defendant (buyer) should be
allowed a reasonable time in which to pay
the sum due the plaintiff, and if not then paid,
there should be a sale of foreclosure to pay
off such balance due plus the costs of action,
the residue, if any, to be paid to the defend-
ant. We are all familiar with the example
which the court had before them, that of a
court of equity in dealing with a mortgage
of real estate and allowing the mortgagor
(buyer) an equity of redemption and provid-
ing for a foreclosure.
That the risk of loss in a conditional sale
falls on the buyer is well settled in this state.
In a leading case,' a certain dry kiln, which
'Singer Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 121 N. C. 168, 28 S.
E. 257 (1897).
' In Chicago Railway Equipment Co. v. MerchantsBank, 136 U. S. 268, 283 (1890), Harlan, J. said,
"The agreement that the title should remain in the
payee until the notes were paid . . . . is a short
form of chattel mortgage. The transaction is, in
legal effect, what it would have been if the maker,
who purchased the cars, had given a mortgage back
to the payee, securing the notes on the property
until they were all fully paid."
IPuffer v. Lucas, 112 N. C. 377, 17 S. E. 174
(1893).
8 Whitlock v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C. 120 58 S. E.
909 (1907). In Tufts v. Griffin, 107 fq. C. 4712 S. E. 68 (1890), the plaintiff sued for the price
of a soda fountain which had been delivered to thedefendant under a conditional sale. The court held
that the plaintiff should recover, though the prop-
erty had been destroyed, and quoted from a case in-
volving similar facts, Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss.
48, 5 So. 627 (1889), in part as follows: "Burnley
unconditionally and absolutely promised to pay a cer-
tain sum for the property the possession of which
he received from Tufts. The fact that the property
was sold with other articles under a condi-
tional sale, was held by the seller for delivery
at the request of the buyer. It was destroyed
without any fault of the seller and the court
held that he could recover the price. Walker,
J. said, "The real and substantial nature of
the transaction for the purpose of determining
who-should bear the loss is that of mortgagor
and mortgagee or lienor and lienee. The
contract, it is true, creates technically a con-
ditional sale, but the vendor, in fact, only re-
tains the legal title as a security in equity
and the title otherwise passes to the vendee
with a lien for the purpose named."'
Let us now consider the situation where
there is an executed sale, with the additional
element that the seller, for the purpose of
securing the purchase price, has the bill of
lading for the goods made out to his own
order. In such cases, if there were no bill of
lading, it is clear that title would pass upon
delivery to the carrier. As a general rule,
when the seller delivers goods to the proper
carrier, consigned to the buyer, the title and
possession of the goods passes to the buyer. "
This is true, however, only if the goods con-
form to specifications, for if the goods are
not what the buyer ordered, title remains in
the seller.'
Then what effect does the bill of lading to
the shipper's order have on the transaction?
What do the parties intend? When business
men ship goods in this way, they intend that
the substantial property interest shall pass to
the buyer. They look at the transaction as
an executed sale, with the bill of lading
made out to the shipper's order for one
purpose only, i. e., to secure the purchase
price, just as the seller in a conditional sale
secures the purchase price by reserving legal
title. Business usage regards the sale as
executed with the seller reserving a bare legal
title for security.
The Sales Act, which, however, is not in
force in North Carolina, provides that where
has been destroyed . . . . before the time of pay.
ment of the note last due, does not relieve him of
payment of the price agreed upon. . He got exactly
what he contracted for, viz., the possession of the
property and the right to acquire an absolute title
by payment of the agreed price. The tranasetion
was something more than an executory conditional
sale. The seller has done all he was to do except
to receive the purchase price; the purchaser has
received all that he was to receive as the consider.
ation of his promise to pay."
9 Whitlock v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C. 120, 58 S. E.
909 (1907).
11 Gwvn Co. v. Railroad, 85 N. C. 429, 39 Am.
Rep. 768 (1881); Acme Paper Box Factory v. Rail.
road, 148 N. C. 421, 62 S. E. 557 (1908).
"Richardson v. Woodruff and Sons, 178 N. C. 46,
100 S. E. 173 (1919).
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goods are shipped and by the bill of lading
are deliverable to the seller or order ....
the seller thereby reserves the property in the
goods. "But if, except for the form of the
bill of lading, the property would have passed
to the buyer on shipment of the goods, the
seller's property in the goods shall be deemed
to be only for the purpose of securing per-
formance, by the buyer of his obligations
under the contract.' In such case, the
goods are at the buyer's risk from the time
of delivery to the carrier." The North
Carolina Supreme Court in the late case of
Penninian v. Winder," however, did not look
beyond the mere fact that the seller had re-
tained title." It was held that the risk of loss
during transit was upon the seller. In that
case, the plaintiff and defendant entered into
a contract for the sale of 95 tons of lime,
f. o. b. vessel at Baltimore. The buyer
arranged with ship brokers for a certain ship
to receive the lime at Baltimore for him.
This was done and the bill of lading was
made to the shipper's order, notify the buyer.
This bill of lading was attached to a sight
draft for the price and sent through a bank
for collection. On the voyage, the ship sank
and this action was to recover the purchase
price. Judgment of non-suit was given and
this was affirmed in the Supreme Court,
Brown, J. saying, "The general rule in mer-
cantile law is that the risk follows the title.
If title had passed to the defendant, then, the
risk of loss was on him. If, on the contrary,
title had not passed to the defendant, but
was retained by the plaintiff, then, the risk in
transit was on the plaintiff and he cannot
recover the price of the lime. We think the
undisputed evidence shows that the title to the
lime was retained by the plaintiff for his own
protection, and that it was only to be de-
livered to the defendant upon payment of the
draft attached to the bill of lading. When
the seller ships goods to order, notify, and
draws for the purchase money, the title and
the right of possession to the property is re-
served by the seller, until the draft is paid.
No title passes to the buyer and any loss in
transit must be borne by the seller.""
12 Sales Act, sec. 20 (2).
"a Sales Act, sec. 22 a. In Alderman Bros. Co.
7. Westinghouse, 92 Conn. 419, 103 Atl. 267(1918) decided under the Sales Act, the buyer was
held liable for the price of goods destroyed in
transit although the bill of lading was made to the
seller's order.
4180 N. C. 73, 103 S. E. 908 (1920).
"See 34 Harv. Law Rev. 741, 752.
10 In York v. Jeffreys, 182 N. C. 452, 109 S. E.
80 (1921), the defendant asked for instructions that
The argument for the result in this case is
more fully set out in an earlier case,' where
the court argues that when goods are shipped
to the consignor's order, it is almost decisive
of the seller's intention to reserve the jis
disponendi and to prevent the property from
passing to the buyer. This, because by the
terms of the bill of lading, the carrier is the
consignor's agent and not the consignee's; the
contract is executory until the draft is paid
and if before that time the goods are destroy-
ed, the loss falls upon the consignor.
This is a strict legal argument in which
ins disponendi and property are erroneously
treated as the same thing. This does not
accord with the modern mercantile view, as
represented in the Sales Act, which is now
in force in half of our states, including all
.the important commercial and manufacturing
states of the East and Middle West. By
applying the reasoning of the cases referred
to in the discussion of conditional sales, the
North Carolina courts might reach the same
result as the Sales Act reaches in the sections
cited. These cases recognize that the holder
of a security title should not bear the risk of
less, because his only interest in the goods
is to be paid for them. Rather it should be
borne by the buyer, because he has the equit-
able ownership, the beneficial incidents of
title. Suppose such reasoning had been fol-
lowed in Penniman v. Winder. It is clear
that, except for the bill of lading, the parties
intended title to pass to the buyer when the
lime was placed on board the buyer's ship at
Baltimore. The shipper had the bill of lading
made out solely to secure the price and what
he thus retained was only a security title.
That the buyer had something in the nature
of ownership is shown by the cases which
allow the buyer, on making tender of the
price, to maintain trover or replevin against
anyone except a purchaser for value of the
bill of lading." The situation is in legal
effect the same as an absolute sale to the
as the goods were shipped by bill of lading "to their
own order, notify buyer," that the plaintiffs assumed
the risk of any delay, because they 'retained title
to the goods during the course of transportation
and until delivery to the defendants upon payment
of the draft. This was not denied, but the court
decided that the shipment moved under a special
contract, which relieved the sellers of liability for
delay over which they had no control, in this case
an embargo on shipping during the war.
"'Asheboro Co. v. Railroad, 149 N. C. 261, 62
S. E. 1091 (1908).
"Williston, Sales, sec. 284, and cases cited. See
Price Brokerage Company v. Railroad, 199 S. W.,
732 (Mo. App. 1917).
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buyer and a mortgage back to the seller to
secure the payment of the price.
The difficulty, as Professor Williston points
out, is that the courts do not understand that
both the seller and the buyer have incidents
of ownership. There is no difficulty in under-
standing this distinction in case of a mort-
gage of land in equity. A security title is
not different in its nature because it refers to
personal property, or is held in the form of a
chattel mortgage, a conditional sale, or a bill
of lading to the seller's order. "
R. H. W.
R.vocATIoN OF PAROLE AFTER ExPiRATIoN
OF SENTENcE-A North Carolina statute'
authorizes the governor to grant a pardon
"subject to such conditions, restrictions and
limitations as he considers proper and neces-
sary" and, upon proof of violation of any of
the conditions, to order the offender recon-
fined for the unexpired portion of the original
sentence. No credit thereon is to be given
for the time that has elapsed between the
date of the conditional pardon and the date
of the rearrest. If, at the time of revocation,
the offender is serving any other sentence of
imprisonment, the reconfinement is to begin
upon the termination of that sentence. Under
this statute, in the recent case of State v.
Yates,2 the Supreme Court of North Carolina
had occasion for the first time to determine
whether the governor has the power to re-
voke a conditional pardon, more familiarly
known as a parole, after expiration of the
period of sentence. The facts in that case
were these. In October, 1919, Yates was
convicted of violation of the prohibition laws
and sentenced to twelve months on the roads.
After serving forty-two days of his sentence,
he was paroled for the balance of his term
upon condition that he maintain good be-
havior. In December, 1921, upon proof of
recent violations of the prohibition laws, the
governor revoked the parole and ordered
Yates returned to prison for the remainder
of his term. Upon certiorari to review the
refusal of a writ of habeas corpus, it was held
that the prisoner was in lawful custody.
This is a problem that has given rise to
some interesting discussion' and to conflicting
"See 34 Harv. Law Rev. 741, 751, 752.
1C. S. sec. 7642-45.
2 111 S. E. 337 (1922).
3 See the notes in 2 Harv. Law Rev. 181, 231; 22
Ibid. 541, and 27 Ibid. 595.
decisions from the courts.' Some of the'cases
seem to have been concerned with the scope of
that power to grant conditional pardons which
is implied from a general constitutional par-
doning power. Others, as the instant case,
have involved the interpretation of general
provisions in statutes authorizing conditional
pardons or paroles.
Those courts which have upheld the power
of the governor to revoke a parole after ex-
piration of sentence seem to have been mainly
impelled by three considerations: (a) The
pardon or parole is an act of executive clem-
ency and may be granted on any conditions,
not illegal, immoral or incapable of perform-
ance, which the governor may prescribe.
And the requirement that a man obey the
laws during the remainder of his life is not
thought to be among these categories. (b)
The prisoner need not accept the pardon or
parole, and, if he does, he accepts the obliga-
tion to perform the conditions annexed with
the consequences attendant upon their viola-
tion. (c) The actual amount of punishment
is the important thing, and not the date of its
termination.
As opposed to these considerations, the
courts which take the view that the governor,
in the absence of express statutory authority,
is without power to revoke a parole after ex-
piration of sentence, do so mainly on these
grounds: (a) A condition of a pardon or
parole whose performance extends beyond
the time for termination of the original sen-
tence is illegal in that it amounts to an
executive lengthening of that sentence. That
is, a paroled convict is so hedged about with
restrictions upon his conduct and movements
as to be essentially in the position of a prison-
er on leave rather than that of a free man.
(b) That a convict's consent to postponement
of sentence upon compliance with certain con-
ditions can hardly be said, in view of the
iature of the alternative, to be a wholly free
and voluntary undertaking. (c) The time ele-
ment, that is, the period of life during which
punishment is suffered, is a vital factor in
any treatment of an offender. One case, at
'The cases are collected and commented upon in
the discussions cited in note 3, and in 5 L. R. A.(N. S.) 1064; 16 Ibid. 304, and 20 R. C. L. 555.
Important decisions in accord with the principal case
are Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146 (1899);
State v. Horne, 52 Fla. 125, 42 So. 388 (1906).
Representative of the equally numerous decisions
contra are In re Prout 12 Idaho 494, 86 -Pae. 275(1906); and Woodward v. Murdock, 124 Ind. 439,
24 N. E. 1047 (1890).
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least, has gone so far as to hold that, in the
absence of contrary provisions in the pardon
itself, the conditions upon which it was
granted will be held to have lapsed at the
termination of the original sentence!s It is
submitted that this is the view most con-
sistent with the nature and purpose of the
modern system of conditional pardons or
paroles. There seems to have been nothing
in the North Carolina constitution or statute
to have required the holding of the principal
case.
On the contrary, there seems to be what is
at least a statutory analogy against it. The
statute mentioned at the beginning of this
note, and the only statute relied upon by the
Court, is an act of 1905, regulating the gov-
ernor's pardoning power generally. It is
found in the chapter on state officers. It
does not expressly deal with the matter of
termination of conditional pardons. There is
another statute on this subject, however, an
act of 1917, found in the fourth article of
the chapter relating to the state prison. This
article is concerned with the powers and duties
of the advisory board of parole. Apparently
this statute relates mainly to the parole of
inmates of the state's prison. Sec. 7753, the
fifth section of that article, contains the fol-
lowing significant sentence: "Such parole
shall be for such time as will fill out the
term of imprisonment to which the prisoner
was sentenced." It is true, of course, that
Yates was never an inmate of the state's
prison, and his case does not seem to have
been handled by the advisory board of parole.
But it is interesting to note that the legisla-
tive conception of the period during which
conditional pardons or paroles of the most
serious type of offenders, those sentenced to
the penitentiary, may be enforced, is less
stringent than that of the Court as to lesser
criminals, namely, those sentenced to local
jails and road gangs. In determining the
meaning of such a statute as sec. 7644, regu-
lating generally the governor's powers as to
revocations of conditional pardons, and the
legality of conditions imposed under a con-
stitutional pardoning power, whose perform-
ance extends beyond the termination of the
original period of sentence, this limitation in
sec. 7753 should have been of definite per-
suasive force.
Regardless, however, of the correctness of
the Yates case as a matter of law, the de-
cision has a direct bearing upon the develop-
ment of a more thorough-going statutory
I Huff v. Dyer, 4 Oh. Cir. Ct. Rep. 595.
system of pardon and parole in North Caro-
lina. The effect of the case is to give the
state, in the case of lesser offenders, a life
jurisdiction over a prisoner released on con-
ditional pardon or parole, regardless of the
nature of his crime, with the attendant right
of supervision of his conduct, and the power
to return the parole violator to prison. From
one point of view this indefinite continuance
of parole should have a salutary effect on
the conduct of this class of paroled men,
They will always have hanging over them the
fear of a summary return to prison if they
fail to go straight. The value of this with
certain types of weak-willed offenderg is
obvious. The outstretched hand of the law
ready to insist on payment for their former
crime without further legal formalities may
be just what is needed to strengthen their
determination to live as law abiding citizens.
On the other hand, are not those courts
right which say that what is virtually life
parole constitutes an unwarranted extension
of punishment? The paroled man, who is re-
leased under the terms of a conditional pardon
before the expiration of his prison sentence, re-
tains, until discharged from parole, the status
of a prisoner. In the case of a paroled inmate
of the state's prison, at least, he is required
by lawc to report to the Superior Court once a
month and to give satisfactory evidence that
his conduct has been in accord with the condi-
tions of the parole. In case of an alleged viola-
tion of his parole, the governor may order his
return to prison without a jury trial as to
his guilt. Parole must therefore be regarded
as a substitute for imprisonment rather than
as a conditional suspension or postponement
of the prison term. And it is easily con-
ceivable that the indefinite continuance of
parole may work a greater hardship on the
convicted man than the original sentence' con-
templated. Any man adjudged worthy of
being released on parole ought to be able to
look forward to the time when he can re-
cover his original status and feel himself to
be on an equality with other men. If the
state retains indefinitely the right of super-
vision of men' released on parole, their only
hope of absolute freedom from the legal con-
sequences of their former crime lies either
in a full and complete pardon, or in the
abandonment of their homes and the conceal-
ment of their identities under assumed names
in new environments.
It is suggested that one practical way out
of this difficulty would be to enact a statute
C. S. sec. 7754.
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providing, as is done in many states,' that
paroles of all persons should terminate either
automatically upon expiration of the maxi-
mum sentence or by formal discharge from
parole at that time by the proper authorities.
M. T. V. H., and
JESSE F. STEINER.
Professor of Social Technology,
University of North Carolina
PART PERFORMANCE AND THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS IN NORTH CAROLINA-"Taking cases
out of the Statute of Frauds by part perform-
ance is an anomaly."' There is, however, a
strong historical justification for so doing,
found in the attitude of the English chan-
cellors during the 17th and 18th centuries
toward the acts of Parliament and in the
broad conception of their power to make
things over along ethical lines.' This attitude
is also seen in the hostility exhibited by the
chancellors of this period toward the Statute
of Limitations. It was due, perhaps, to a
feeling that their power was too great to be
circumscribed by an act of Parliament In
this country, there are a number of different
views as to taking cases of oral contracts for
the purchase and sale of land out of the
Statute of Frauds by part performance. By
the weight of authority, taking possession
alone is sufficient.' In some jurisdictions, not
only must possession be taken under the oral
contract, but valuable improvements must be
erected In others, possession must be taken
and part or all of the purchase money paid."
In four jurisdictions, including North Caro-
lina, the doctrine of part performance has
been repudiated." This note discusses the main
features of the North Carolina view.
7See E. R. Cass, A Study of Parole Laws andMethods in the United States, Prison Association of
New York, 1921.
'Roscoe Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919; Equity, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 933, 935.2 1bid; p. 941.
3"When chancellors held such ideas, a substantiallivery of seisin, the substance of a common law con-
veyenee, or a serious hardship upon purchaser,
which might be brought under the all embracing and
magic word, 'fraud,' might well suffice to move them
to dispense with the Statute." Ibid; p. 941.
'Butcher v. Stapely, 1 Vernon 363 (1685), 1 Ames
Eq. Cas. 279, and note.
S Burns v. Dagget, 141 Mass. 368, 6 N. E. 723(1886); see 18 Harv. E. Rev. 137. See also Moore
v. Small, 19 Pa. 461 (1852).
9 Wright v. Raftree, 181 Ill. 464, 473, 54 N. E.
998 (1899.) See also n. 15, post.
7 The three other jurisdictions are Miss., Ky. andTenn. See Houston v. Jordan, 42 Miss. 380 (1869);Dean v. Cassidy 88 Ky. 572, 11 S. W. 601 (1899);
Batton v. McClure, Mart & Y. (Tenn.) 333 (1828).Apparently the rule in these jurisdictions was
fQrmerly the rule in Mass. See Buck v. Dowley,16 Gray 555 (1860); Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass.24, 33 (1869). The present rule in Mass. is less
stringent; Potter v. Jacobs, 111 Mass. 32 (1872);
Low v. Low 173 Mass. 580, 54 N. E. 257 (1899).See Story, Eq. Jur., 14 ed., sec. 1045; Clark, Equity,
sec. 133-134; Bispham, Equity, 9 ed., sec. 384.
In Ballard v. Boyctte,' after pointing out
that there is no doctrine in North Carolina
whereby part performance may take a case
out of the Statute of Frauds, the Court calls
attention to the fact that the owner of land,
who makes a parol agreement, cannot repudi-
ate it and also claim the benefits thereof,
whether money paid on the purchase price or
the improvements made by the purchaser. In
the opinion in that case, the late Judge W. R.
Allen cites, among other cases, Ellis v Ellis,'
and quotes the general rule from Pitt v,
Moore," as follows: "Whatever may have
been the ancient rule, it is now well settled
by many decisions, from Baker v. Carson,"
in which there was a divided court, but in
which Ruffin, C. J., and Gaston, J. concurred,
and Albea v. Griffin,' by a unanimous court,
to Hedgepeth v. Rose,"s that where the labor
or the money of a person had been expended
in a permanent improvement and enrichment
of the property of another by a parol contract
or agreement, which cannot be enforced be-
cause, and only because, it is not in writing,
the party repudiating the contract, as he may
do, will not be allowed to take and hold the
property thus improved and enriched, 'with-
out compensation for the additional value
which these improvements have conferred
upon the property,' and it rests upon the broad
principle that it is against conscience that one
man shall be enriched to the injury and cost
of another induced by his own act."
This, on principal, is the logical and cor-
rect view, although it may sometimes fail to
do justice between the parties in a particular
case. As an act of the North Carolina legis-
lature, the Statute of Frauds, if constitutional,
is binding, and judicial legislation should not
be undertaken by the courts to thwart the
plain language of the authorized lawmakers,
whatever may be the opinion of the judges
as to its wisdom, and whatever may have been
the 17th century conception of the effect of
an act of Parliament. If a modification of
legislation is needed it is for the people to
command, not for the judiciary to legislate,
Judge Story presents " the majority view
of the English and American courts as fol-
lows: "The distinct ground upon which
courts of equity interfere in cases of this sort
is, that otherwise, one party would be enabled
to practise a fraud upon the other; and it
could never be the intention of the Statute to
8171 N. C. 24, 86 S. E. 175 (1915).
9 16 N. C. 341 (1829).
1099 N. C. 85; 5 S. E. 389 (1888).
st21 N. C. 381 (1836).
- 22 N. C. "9 (1838).
195 N. C. 41 (1886).
"12 Story, Eq. Jur., 14 ed., sec. 1045.
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enable any party to commit such a fraud with
impunity. Indeed fraud in all cases consti-
tutes an answer to the most solemn acts and
conveyances." The Statute says contra, how-
ever, and there is no fraudulent result where,
as in North Carolina, the purchaser is allowed
compensation, for the value of his improve-
ments. Judge Story's statement, however, of
the qualifying principle which ought to govern
in cases of this sort is enlightening, and it
would be well if it had been consistently
applied. He states that nothing is to be con-
sidered as a part performance which does not
put a party into a situation which will amount
to a fraud upon him if the agreement is not
fully performed.'
Dean Pound concludes that "the equities of
one who has been put in possession or of one
who has partly performed, call for making
him whole for what he is out upon faith of
the contract, so far as a court of equity may
do so. Hence they amply justify the view of
certain Southern courts, which carry equitable
relief so far as to give the purchaser an
accounting and a complete restitution, but no
further."" After referring to Lord Sel-
borne's opinion in Maddison v. Alderson,5 as
the best rationalization of part performance
to be found, he concludes that the "tendency
of the American courts to require something
more than merely taking possession under the
contract, and the refusal of many courts to
grant relief even in hard cases of service,
where no possession is taken, without some
act solely referable to the contract, are well
justified and are in the right line to progress
toward a satisfactory law upon this subject." I
It is pointed out in a note in the Harvard
Law Review,9 that the results of the North
Carolina view are not always just. The case
referred to in this note is Pass v. Brooks,
2
'
where, under an oral contract for the purchase
of land the defendant entered into possession,
paid the purchase price and made permanent
improvements. It was held that in cases
within the Statute of Frauds a court of equity
will not grant specific performance. With
reference to the justice of such a case, suffi-
1 2 Story, Eq. Jur., 14 ed., sec. 1047, n. I. See
also note 6, supra.
2 33 Harv. L. Rev., 933, 936, 939, 944.
iT 8 App. Cas. 467, 475-476 (1883).
Is 33 Harv. L. Rev. 933, 944. "As a matter of
principle, it would seem that this minority view and
the theory by which it is usually explained is the
preferable one." Clark, Equity, sec. 135.
ii 13 Harv. L. Rev. 410.
' 125 N. C. 129, 34 S. E. 228 (1899). A etition
to rehear this case was allowed in 127 N. C. 119,
37 S. E. 151 (1900). The result of the case, how-
ever, was not materially changed.
cient importance does not seem to have been
attached by the writer of the note in the
Harvard Law Review to the fact that the
Court in the Pass case required restitution of
the purchase money and compensation for im-
provements. The comment in the note on the
rule is as follows: "That such a rule will
often fail to do justice between the parties,
is obvious, and the results of the prevailing
doctrine are far more satisfactory, though
usually not reached without some violence to
the words of the Statute." ' The view there
expressed is that injustice results if specific
performance is not allowed. It is submitted
that the Statute clearly makes that result
inevitable, and that justice is done by the
other relief given.
The North Carolina cases fall chiefly into
groups where possession was taken and val-
uable improvements made,' or where a part
or all of the purchase money was paid, 3 or
where as in the recent case of Perry v.
Norton,2' the plaintiff worked under a parol
agreement and also made valuable improve-
ments. In that case, the defendant was to
pay plaintiff $40.00 a month and in addition
to deed him the cottage and lot occupied in
lieu of higher wages he could have received
by working elsewhere. Held, defendant is
liable for improvements made by plaintiff.
The plaintiff's equity "rests upon the broad
principle that it is against conscience for one
man to be enriched to the injury and cost of
another, which was induced by his own acts. '
In the recent case of Carter v. Carter,2 ' the
court holds that where the full amount of the
2 See also 12 Harv. L.' Rev. 506. Compare:
Wilkie v. Womble, 90 N. C. 254 (1884), (cited in
note in 19 L. R. A. 879); Murdock v. Anderson,
57 N. C. 77 (1858); Ellis v. Ellis, 16 N. C. 398(1830). See note 26, post.
- Luton v. Badham, 127 N. C. 96, 37 S. E. 143(1900); citing Ellis v. Ellis, 16 N. C. 341 (1829);
Albca v. Griffin, 22 N. C. 9 (1838); Lyon v. Criss-
man, 22 N. C. 268 (1839); Pitt v. Moore, 99 N. C.
85, 5 S. E. 389 (1888); Tucker v. M11arkland, 101
N. C. 422, 8 S. E. 169 (1888); Chambers v. Massey,
42 N. C. 286 (1851); Thomas v. Kyles, 54 N. C. 302
(1854); Love v. Neilson, 54 N. C. 339 (1854).
23Ballard v. Boyette, 171 N. C. 24, 86 S. E. 175
(1915); Kelly v. Johnson, 135 N. C. 647, 47 S. E.
574 (1904); Ford v. Stroud, 150 N. C. 362, 64 S.
E. 1 (1909); Hedgepeth v. Rose, 95 N. C. 41
(1886) Danicl v. Crunpler, 75 N. C. 184 (1876);
Carter v. Carter, 182 N. C. 186, 108 S. E. 765(1921).
24 182 N. C. 585, 109 S. E. 641 (1921).
2 Citing Luton v. Badham, 127 N. C. 96, 37 S.
E. 143, 53 L. R. A. 337, 80 Am. St. Rep. 783
(1900); Ford v. Stroud, 150 N. C. 362, 64 S. E.
1 (1909); Ballard v. Boyette, 171 N. C. 24, 86 S. E.
175 (1915); and citing also "the very able and the
writer (Walker J.) thinks, conclusive opinion of
Smith C. 3., in McCracken v. McCracken, 88 N. C.
272 (1883)."
= 182 N. C. 186, 108 S. E. 765 (1921).
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purchase money is paid and the purchaser
enters into possession and makes improve-
ments under a parol contract to convey land,
and where the vendor afterward repudiates
by refusing to convey, the purchaser may re-
cover the price and, in addition, the value of
his improvements to the extent that they have
enhanced the value of the land. On page 766,
the Court refers to Jones v. Sandlin,' and
says that "the general rule is that if one is
induced to improve land under a promise to
convey the same to him, which promise is void
or voidable, and after the improvements are
made he refuses to convey, the party thus
disappointed shall have the benefit of the
improvements to the extent that they increased
the value of the land." "
Thus it seems that North Carolina has con-
sistently, in all fact situations, enforced the
equities between the parties by making the
disappointed vendee whole, as far as practica-
ble, even though the unwritten contract as
such has been thought to be unenforceable be-
cause of the effect of the Statute.
As late as 1900, however, Judge Douglas
could not even concur in the judgment in
Luton v. Badhan,3' because it seemed to him
"to fly in the teeth of the statute of frauds."
The Court held in that case that the vendor
in possession, who repudiates a parol contract
to convey land, is liable to the vendee for the
value of the improvements made by the latter.
Judge Douglas felt that the vendee's claim
for improvements was a purely defensive
remedy. He thought that the Statute "though
founded on acknowledged principles of public
policy and repeatedly affirmed and reaffirmed
by legislative enactment was doomed to ulti-
mate emasculation by the well-meaning, but
dangerous relaxations of the courts, based
upon the extension of equitable principles."
He pointed out that the plaintiff was not in
possession and that this distinguished the case
from previous cases. If he felt this way
about the North Carolina view how must he
have felt about the majority elsewhere? He
- 160 N. C. 150, 154, 75 S. E. 1075, 1077 (1912).
Eg Citing Kelly v. Johnson, 135 N. C. 647, 47 S.
E. 674 (1904); Reed v. Exum, 84 N. C. 430(1881); Luton v. Badham, 127 N. C. 96, 37 S. E.
143, 53 L. R. A. 337, 80 Am. St. Rep. 783 (1900);
Albea v. Griffin, 22 N. C. 9 (1838); Hedgepeth v.
Rose, 95 N. C. 41 (1886); Pitt v. Moore, 99 N. C.
85, 5 S. E. 389, 6 Am. St. Rep. 489 (1888). Mc.
Cracken v. McCracken, 88 N. C. 272, 276 (1883),
is also referred to as is the fact that judge Ruffin(the younger, and not the Chief Justice who was
on the bench when Judge Gaston wrote Albea v.
Griffin and he himself wrote Baker v. Carson) said
that Albea v. Griffin is "often referred to as the
leading case on the subject."
127 N. C. 96, 37 S. E. 143, 53 L. R. A. 337,
80 Am. St. Rep. 783 (1900).
referred to McCracken v. McCrackcn,' as the
only case where the vendee had even asked
for the value of the improvements. In that
case the vendor offered to let the vendee take
his improvements, one of them being a mill
race dug in the ground. But as Judge Douglas
pointed out, "A hole in the ground is not a
very valuable piece of property when severed
from the realty, and so the vendee asked the
court to give him something else instead.""
The rule for estimating the value of the
improvements is declared in Wetherall v.
Gorian.3' It is not what they cost the de-
fendant, but how much they have added to
the value of the premises." P. H. W.
LEGISLATIVE POWER TO PENALIZE VIOLATION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULE-For many years,
the existence of administrative agencies to
carry into effect the general policies of legis-
lation has been found convenient and neces-
ary to the attainment of governmental ends.
As the complexities of social and economic
affairs have increased, there has been a definite
tendency to relieve the legislature of more
and more technical and detailed tasks, and to
place those responsibilities upon adminis-
trative agencies.' And, irrespective of the
familiar proposition that legislative power
cannot be delegated, these agencies may in
fact be vested with the power to enact rea-
sonable rules and regulations to carry the
general legislative policy into effect.' Some-
what like the principle underlying the validity
of broad delegations of legislative power to
municipalities, which may be considered as
an historical and inherent exception to the
general rule, this kind of legislation, namely,
a grant of rule-making authority, has been
upheld upon the necessity for entrusting to
especially skilled enforcement officers the task
of specifying more technical and detailed rules
and regulations in furtherance of the general
policies embraced in the statute.'
.o88 N. C. 272 (1883).
3L 127 N. C., at p. 108, 37 S. E., at p. 147.
-' 74 N. C. 603 (1876).
3 See also Chatham v. Realty Co., 174 N. C. 671,
94 S. E. 447 (1917); Daniel v. Crumplcr, 75 N. C.
184 (1876).
1 State v. Crosby, 92 Minn. 176, 99 N. W. 636(1904); Cook v. Burnquist, 242 Fed. 321 (1917).
"Interstate Commerce Com. v. Goodrich Trans.
Co., 224 U. S. 194, 56 L. Ed. 729, 737 (1912);
State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 56 Fla. 617, 47
So. 969, 32 L. R. A. (n. s.) 639, 659 (1908).
2 Tyrrell County v. Holloway, 182 N. C. 64, 108
S. E. 337 (192 1); Cooley on Taxation, 3d Ed., 101.
4 Atlantic Express Co. v. W. & W. R. R., 111 N. C.
463, 16 S. E. 393 (1892); Georgia R. R. v. Smith,
70 Ga. 694 (1883); Buetfield v. Stranahan, 192 U, S.
470, 496, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, 48 L. Ed. 525 (1904).
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Granting that the legislature may delegate
to an administrative agency the power to make
rules and regulations which will have the
force of law for all civil purposes,' may the
legislature make the violation of these rules
a criminal offense? ' There are at least two
conceivable fact situations. Suppose the legis-
lature should enact that all the existing
rules and regulations of a certain adminis-
trative agency are adopted and made statutory,
and that any violation thereof should be pun-
ishable as a criminal offense. Here, there can
be no doubt as to the power of the legislature
because it raises the rule into law itself.! In
pther words, the legislature defines the rule
of conduct as effectually as if the rules and
regulations penalized had been originally en-
acted in the legislative halls. On the other
hand, suppose, as is the familiar case, that
the legislature, upon creating a new admin-
istrative agency, with the power to promul-
gate retsonable rules and regulations, should,
in advance, provide that a violation of any
such rule should be a crime. Is this a valid
exercise of legislative power? Is this not
delegating to an administrative board the
authority to establish a standard of conduct
and to define a criminal offense? ' The ulti-
mate question is, which authority by prescrib-
ing the rule of conduct defines the offense?
Is it the legislature, when it provides for the
punishment and establishes a broad standard
of conduct? Or, is it the administrative
board, which determines the precise rule of
conduct and specifies the exact facts and cir-
.cumstances under which punishment is to be
invoked?
If it is the legislature itself which pre-
scribes the rule of conduct and thus defines
the offense, it must be because the legislature
in advance ordains that a certain general
standard of conduct is to be maintained in a
given general connection-that fish are to be
protected in breeding season-and then leaves
it to the enforcement agency on the ground
to make the standard more specifically appli-
cable to the facts. In other words, this view
is that the agency merely defines more ex-
actly a standard of conduct already broadly
established by the legislature; that the stand-
5 U. S. v. Shannon, 160 Fed. 870 (1908); U. S. v.
Dasteraignes, 118 Fed. 199 (1902).
0 U. S. v. Maid, 116 Fed. 650. 652 (1902); U. S.
v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, 688, 12 Sup. Ct. 764, 36
L. Ed. S91 (1892).T Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. Ed. 717(1880).
8 U. S. v. Matthews, 146 Fed. 306 (1906); Ex
Parte Koliock, 165 U. S. 526, 533, 41 L. Ed. 813,
815 (1897).
ard violated is that of a general character
established by statute.
But if it is the prescription of the detailed
rule by the board and not the action of the
legislature which really defines the offense,
then the justification lies rather in expediency
than in legal doctrine. The contrariety of
opinion on this point indicates the possible
unsoundness in holding that this latter con-
ception is not one of an actual delegation of
legislative power.? The practical effect of
the decisions is such as to establish the belief
that they were influenced more by the tend-
ency of the time and necessity of the case
than by reconciliation with the theory that
legislative power may not be delegated."
In the case of United States v. Grivzaud,u
the Supreme Court of the United States was
confronted with an extreme situation, and by
upholding the legislation there involved, it was
compelled not only to reverse a long line of
decisions of inferior federal courts but to
overrule, as well, its own prior decision in
the same case.' An Act of Congress had
created certain forest reservations and had
vested in the Secretary of Agriculture gen-
eral supervisory power with authority to make
such rules and regulations as would accomplish
the purpose specified. Any violation of a
regulation passed by the Secretary of Agri-
culture and published for a certain length of
time was made a criminal offense. The de-
fendant, having been indicted for grazing
sheep upon the reservation without a permit,
contrary to a regulation adopted by the Sec-
retary of Agriculture and promulgated as
required by the Act of Congress, demurred
to the indictment. The demurrer was sus-
tained in the District court on the ground
that there was no offense stated in the in-
dictment, Congress alone having power to
create a criminal offense. Upon appeal by
the United States, the Supreme Court first
affirmed the decision of the District Court.
On a rehearing, however, the Court over-
ruled its prior decision and sustained the
validity of the legislation. The following ex-
tract is from the opinion in this case: "But
See note 6, supra.
'o Ernst Freund, Principles of Legislation, 10 Am.
Pol. Sei. Rev. 1, 14; J. B. Cheadle, Legislative
Functions, 27 Yale L. J. 892.
It220 U. S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct. 480, 55 L. Ed. 563
(1910).
'3Reversing 170 Fed. 205 (1909); Light v. U. S.
220 U. S. 523, 31 Sup. Ct. 485, 55 L. Ed. 570(1910); U. S. v. Rizzinell, 182 Fed. 675 (1910);
U. S. v. Burke, 221 Fed. 1014 (1915). Judgment
Reversed, Sales v. U. S., 234 Fed. 842, 148 C. C. A.
440 (1916); Contra, see U. S. v. Matthews, 146
Fed. 306 (1906).
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the authority to make administrative rules is
riot a delegation of legislative power, nor are
such rules raised from administrative to a
legislative character because the violation
thereof is made a criminal offense." The
Court seems to come to the conclusion that
the mere enactment of the administrative
regulation did not of itself create the of-
fense, that this was done by the action of
the legislature in the first instance."
The result of the Grimaud Case has often
been reached by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina. Perhaps the most interesting cases
arising in this state involving this question
have been concerned with the compulsory
vaccination and cattle tick laws. The vacci-
nation law authorizes certain boards of
health in emergencies to require the vacci-
nation of all inhabitants of the specified
territory." The cattle tick law vests in the
Board of Agriculture the power in emergen-
cies to declare certain districts under quaran-
tine, and to require all tick infested animals
within the district to be dipped." The vio-
lation of the rules made pursuant to these
acts is made a criminal offense. Both laws
have been upheld in every particular' It
should be noted that here the problem in-
volves elements both of contingent legislation
and of legislative power to penalize violation
of administrative rules. That is to say, the
board determines when the emergency exists
'31But see dissenting opinion of Field, J., in Ex
Parte Siebold, supra, note 7.
1' C. S. sec. 7164.
1C. S. sec. 4688, 4873.
1 Morgan v. Stewart, 144 N. C. 424, 57 S. E. 149
(1907); State v. Hodges, 180 N. C. 751, 105 S. E.
417 (1920). See also Synitt; v. State, 74 Tex. Cr.
232, 168 S. W. 522 (1914).
under which the power to make rules be-
comes operative, and, in advance of their
enactment, violations thereof are made pun-
ishable by law.
The most recent decision in North Caro-
lina is that of State v. Dudley." The Fish-
eries Board was created for the purpose of
carrying out a general statutory policy of
preserving the fish supply. Pursuant to
legislative authority vested in it to make
regulations, the violation of which was made
a crime, the Board enacted a regulation pro-
hibiting, in certain waters of the state, the
taking of scallops with drags. The defend-
ant was found guilty of violating this regula-
tion and the Supreme Court in upholding the
conviction cited and approved the Grimaud
Case. The Court decided the case, however,
as if it were mainly concerned with con-
tingent legislation, and took the view that
it was the legislature which defined the
offense.
It is submitted that a violator of a rule
or regulation of an administrative agency
actually commits a breach of a duty imposed,
not by the general language of the statute,
but by the more definite provisions of the rule
or regulation, and that the legislature, when
it authorizes the enactment of rules and
regulations and penalizes violations thereof,
actually delegates legislative power to define
a rule of future conduct. The results of the
cases discussed represent an inevitable and
entirely desirable relaxation of the theoreti-
cal principle prohibitive of the delegation of.
legislative power.
D. W. I.
11 182 N. C. 822, 109 S. E. 63 (1921). Accord,
Payne v. Prozidence Gas Co., 31 R. I. 295, 77 Atl
143, Ann. Cas. 1912 B 65 (1910).
